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Article
Revisiting the Precedential
Status of Crown Court
Decisions
Kwan Ho Lau
Singapore Management University, Singapore
Abstract
The binding authority of substantive decisions made by the Crown Court in the exercise of its
criminal jurisdiction is often assumed to be negligible. In 2013, the Court of Appeal appeared to
confirm the correctness of that assumption. Yet there was little in the way of explanation or
case law that was cited in support by the court. This article suggests that a re-evaluation of the
place and treatment of such decisions within the doctrine of precedent is overdue, and
considers that they should be recognised to have some binding effect if there is able to be
established a reasonably satisfactory process to facilitate their systematic and public
dissemination, whether electronic or otherwise.
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Introduction
A number of commentators have suggested that decisions of the Crown Court possess no formal
binding force.1 Many viewed the lack of systematic reporting of such decisions to be the major
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1. R Cross, Precedent in English Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1961) 6 (originally in respect of quarter sessions, subsequently
updated in later editions to cover the successor Crown Court; see R Cross, Precedent in English Law (3rd edn Clarendon Press,
Oxford 1977) 7); A Ashworth, ‘The Binding Effect of Crown Court Decisions’ [1980] Crim LR 402; D Feldman, ‘Regulating
Treatment of Suspects in Police Stations: Judicial Interpretation of Detention Provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence
Act 1984’ [1990] Crim LR 452; R Cross and JW Harris, Precedent in English Law (4th edn Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991) 123;
K Kerrigan, ‘Miscarriage of Justice in the Magistrates’ Court: The Forgotten Power of the Criminal Cases Review Commission’
[2006] Crim LR 124, 138; T Ingman, The English Legal Process (13th edn OUP, Oxford 2011) 209; P Morgan, ‘Doublethink
and District Judges: High Court Precedent in the County Court’ (2012) 32 LS 421, 440; J Martin, English Legal System
(Routledge, Abingdon 2014) 11; M Zander, The Law-Making Process (7th edn Hart, Oxford 2015) 241; R Card and J Molloy,
Card, Cross & Jones Criminal Law (22nd edn OUP, Oxford 2016) 13; AA Gillespie and S Weare, The English Legal System
(7th edn OUP, Oxford 2019) para 3.4.1.5; D Kelly, Slapper and Kelly’s English Legal System (19th edn Routledge, Abingdon
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factor negativing their binding authority.2 Since these commentaries the Court of Appeal has
seemingly confirmed that Crown Court decisions do not have authoritative value.3 It is suggested
in this article—which is solely concerned with substantive decisions made by the Crown Court in
the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction—that that conclusion should be revisited in the light of
recent developments.4
Do Crown Court Decisions Have Any Authoritative Value?
The Case of R v X Ltd
In R v X Ltd,5 the Court of Appeal case alluded to above, counsel had attempted to rely on a prior first
instance decision made by a Recorder in the Crown Court. That was greeted with judicial surprise and
scepticism. Some wonderment was expressed at why such a decision had been reported; once the pulse
reverted to normal the Court of Appeal peremptorily dismissed the authority of that decision, saying that
its reasoning was unpersuasive for the purposes of the instant case.6
What is of present interest is the court’s further statement that that particular Crown Court decision
had no authoritative value, being one made at first instance by a judge neither of the High Court nor
sitting in the High Court.7 This somewhat elliptical pronouncement was made without supporting
authority, and indicates three possibly separate reasons for the refusal to give the decision any prece-
dential standing.
The first reason is that the decision was made at first instance rather than on appeal. The second is that
it was decided by a judge of lower rank than a High Court Judge. And the third is that it was decided in a
court that was below the High Court in hierarchy. The Court of Appeal’s ruling could be read as
suggesting that all three of these factors must be apparent before the authority of the decision in question
is negatived. Another reading, admittedly attributing meaning not immediately detectable from the
court’s choice of language, is that the presence of only some, but not all, of those factors is sufficient
to deny the decision its precedential status.
The former reading is not attractive primarily because of the difficulties in ascribing dispositive
significance to some of the enumerated factors. Let us take them in turn. Whether the doctrine of
precedent should differentiate between a first instance decision and a decision made on appeal, both
of which are issued in the same court, is an issue possessed of divergent authority. On the one hand,
Master McCloud recently observed such a differentiation,8 and the Divisional Court is said to only bind
itself when acting in its appellate but not supervisory capacity.9 This seems though to open up the result
to a considerable degree of arbitrariness, since the same point of law could have arisen on appeal or at
2020) para 4.4.4; S Wilson and others, English Legal System (4th edn OUP, Oxford 2020) 197. See further the views of the
Office of Criminal Justice Reform in the Law Commission’s report on The High Court’s Jurisdiction in Relation to Criminal
Proceedings (Law Com No 324, 2010) para 12.2.
2. See also the passing note in P Rock, The Social World of an English Crown Court (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1993) 183 (‘After
all, one judge’s knowledge of another was necessarily imperfect and often second-hand, based perhaps on written articles (one
of the Court’s judge’s dicta were reported from time to time and he would write letters to the editors of newspapers) and
colleagues’ own reports’).
3. Technically, of course, it is the holding of law forming the ratio decidendi of the decision, and not the decision itself, which
would be binding if at all, and so long as this is borne in mind it is not harmful to write that a decision may bind a court.
4. A call for reconsideration has been sounded also in C Cox, ‘The Elephant in the Sales Room: Ivory and the British Antiques
Trade’ (2016) 23 IJCP 321, 327–28.
5. [2013] EWCA Crim 818; [2014] 1 WLR 591.
6. Ibid [24].
7. Ibid.
8. JLE v Warrington & Halton Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2018] EWHC B18 (Costs) [23].
9. Rogers v Essex County Council [1985] 1 WLR 700, 706; Ritz Video Film Hire Ltd v Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council
(unreported, 26 January 1995, Divisional Court).
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first instance; according precedence to one decision but not the other is unproductive of the predictability
desired.10 Such a form of distinction was indeed rejected in Coral Reef Ltd v Silverbond Enterprises
Ltd.11 It might once have been a rebuttal that the law was deliberated upon more closely on appeal than at
first instance, but the industry of judges and counsel combined with their access to case law12 means that
any difference in quality is, even accounting for the practice in jury trials,13 more theoretical than real
nowadays.14 It can consequently be argued with some force that the doctrine of precedent ought not to
distinguish between a Crown Court decision made at first instance and one made on appeal from any of
the Magistrates’ Courts.
The second factor is that the case has been decided by a judge lower in rank than a High Court Judge.
There are again conflicting authorities on whether rank matters in determining precedence as between
the decisions of higher and lower courts. In R v Thompson,15 Master Gordon-Saker reasoned that since a
decision of a Judge made in High Court proceedings was binding on a Costs Judge, it would be illogical
if a decision of a High Court Judge sitting in the Crown Court were not.16 However, Master Rowley in
R v Jagelo17 declined to follow the decision of a High Court Judge made in the Crown Court; he said that
it would be an unattractive proposition if the decision of a Crown Court Judge who was not a High Court
Judge was only persuasive, but a decision of a High Court Judge was binding notwithstanding that it was
made in the same court.18 Implicit support for the latter position may be located in R v Hertsmere
Borough Council, ex parte Woolgar19 and R v Southwark London Borough Council, ex parte Bediako,20
both of which explain that a High Court Judge and a Deputy High Court Judge—who is obviously of
lower rank—are when sitting in the High Court bound only by comity and not a rule of strict precedent to
follow each other.
The Court of Appeal’s earlier decision in Howard de Walden Estates Ltd v Aggio21 appears though to
have put to rest any doubt that the operation of the doctrine of stare decisis between courts at different
levels depends on the positions of the courts rather than of the judges hearing the cases. It was ruled there
that the County Court was bound by the decisions of judges sitting in the High Court, whether made at
first instance or on appeal, because the County Court was inferior to and lower in the hierarchy than the
High Court.22 In a relationship between lower and higher courts, it seems appropriate that court
10. See also P Jackson, ‘The Divisional Court: The Survival of Binding Precedent’ (1985) 101 LQR 484; KH Lau, ‘Precedent
Within the High Court’ (2020) 40 LS 397, 413–14.
11. [2016] EWHC 3844 (Ch); [2018] 4 WLR 104, [62].
12. Which (one hopes) deflects some of the specific criticism levelled against the continued publication of lower court decisions in
B Robertson, ‘The Looking-Glass World of Section 78’ (1989) 139 NLJ 1223, 1225.
13. cf Morgan (n 1) 438–39.
14. Lau (n 10) 414.
15. [2015] 1 Costs LR 173.
16. Ibid [13]. See also P Cooper and D Wurtzel, ‘A Day Late and a Dollar Short: In Search of an Intermediary Scheme for
Vulnerable Defendants in England and Wales’ [2013] Crim LR 4, 12 (‘No decision of a circuit judge creates binding precedent
and few are reported’ (emphasis added)).
17. [2016] 1 Costs LO 133.
18. Ibid [56].
19. (1995) 27 HLR 703, 716.
20. (1997) 30 HLR 22, 25. Because he was sitting as a deputy, the judge indicated that the threshold of conviction for identifying
error was higher than usual, but, as I have mentioned elsewhere, I read this to refer to the degree of deference and not to
remove the case altogether from the situation in which co-ordinate courts follow each other out of comity; see Lau (n 10) 409.
Sed quaere Bristol & West Building Society v Trustee of the Property of Back [1998] 1 BCLC 485, 488; In re SHB Realisations
Ltd [2018] EWHC 402 (Ch); [2018] Bus LR 1173, [47].
21. [2007] EWCA Civ 499; [2008] Ch 26.
22. Ibid [92]–[95]. This was questioned in Morgan (n 1) but since then the Supreme Court has cited the holding in Howard de
Walden approvingly; see Willers v Joyce (No 2) [2016] UKSC 44; [2018] AC 843, [5]. On a separate note, the Willers
judgment also proposed that the Privy Council had power to change the law of England and Wales; on this aspect see P
Mirfield, ‘A Novel Theory of Privy Council Precedent’ (2017) 133 LQR 1; J Sorabji, ‘Precedent and the Privy Council’ (2017)
36 CJQ 265.
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hierarchy should determine the relative precedential status of their decisions.23 That particular exercise
requires comparison of a stable and outwardly discernible quality of judgments. Using the rank of the
deciding judge ticks the discernibility box but not the stability box, because in the system to which we are
accustomed judges of different age, rank and seniority can potentially hear the same types of cases. Using the
position of the deciding court, however, ticks both boxes. The importance of this as regards Crown Court
practice is not to be underestimated when one considers that the list of judges allowed to sit includes High
Court Judges, Circuit Judges and Recorders, not to mention their respective deputies where permissible.
It is therefore the third factor—that the decision was made by a court below the High Court in the
hierarchical order—which appears or should appear as critical in the pronouncement in R v X Ltd that
Crown Court decisions have no authoritative value. The way in which the Court of Appeal has elucidated
the position suggests that the deficiency is absolute in its view. That is not how some understand the
current practice; as alluded to earlier, according to R v Thompson a decision of a High Court Judge, made
when sitting in the Crown Court, exerts binding force on a Costs Judge. Although not universally
accepted, it remains possible to contend that this is one instance in which decisions of the Crown Court
carry precedential authority.
Recent Developments
Two developments have now called into further question the unqualified nature of the rule seemingly
pronounced in R v X Ltd.
The first is a strong and consistent line of authority that the Upper Tribunal, being a superior court of
record,24 is empowered to set precedent.25 Its decisions therefore have precedential value at least with
respect to the First-tier Tribunal, from which appeals to the Upper Tribunal generally lie. The greater
debate has been over whether the Upper Tribunal itself is strictly bound by decisions of the High Court,
an issue which requires elaboration later, but for present purposes the point is that the Crown Court is
also a superior court of record26 that hears appeals from the Magistrates’ Courts. By the same logic it
ought theoretically to possess power to set precedent, disregarding any remnant historical incumbrances.
The Upper Tribunal being primarily a civil tribunal does not appear to be a relevant difference in this
regard. There is in fact no persuasive reason why reasoned rulings of law by the Crown Court judiciary—
largely drawn from senior members of the criminal Bar—should today be viewed as so exceptionally
deficient than those as emanate from other superior courts of record. A significant number of cases are
heard at Crown Court level and important decisions will be handed down from time to time.
The other development has been the modern retrievability of written decisions, for if the lack of
systematic publication of Crown Court decisions was formerly the chief reason why they were seen to
lack formal binding effect, that now requires fresh evaluation in light of contemporary innovations in
database and recordkeeping technology.
As an initial remark, there should of course be heeded the salutary warning given by Robert Megarry,
made prior to his judicial ascent, that a decision ought not to be rejected out of hand merely because there
was no orthodox report of it.27 In Beach v Smirnov,28 Ouseley J rejected any suggestion that a High Court
decision appearing in the White Book held greater authority than other High Court decisions which did
not.29 And, even more pertinently, it was stated in Coral Reef that the ready availability of decisions by
23. Which I also discuss elsewhere; see Lau (n 10) 406.
24. Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 s 3(5).
25. R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2009] EWHC 3052 (Admin); [2010] 2 WLR 1012, [75], and on appeal [2011] UKSC 28; [2012] 1
AC 663, [43]; Gilchrist v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2014] UKUT 169 (TCC); [2015] Ch 183, [88].
26. Senior Courts Act 1981 s 45(1).
27. RE Megarry, ‘Reporting the Unreported’ (1954) 70 LQR 246, 250.
28. [2007] EWHC 3499 (QB).
29. Ibid [10].
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Masters ought not to be a determinative consideration as regards their precedential status, because the
doctrine of precedent had to operate regardless of whether the decisions of a particular court were readily
available or not, and its scope could not be altered by changing practice in the distribution of judicial
decisions over time.30
It must be realised though that any move towards according some binding effect to reasoned decisions
of the Crown Court has to be accompanied by an increase in their accessibility. A system of precedent is
unable to function effectively or consistently if there is no outlet into public consciousness for the rulings
handed down.31 That parallel necessity can now potentially be fulfilled by the systematic electronic
dissemination of such decisions or, at the very least, the full transcripts via online databases.32 The
institution of an appropriate practice for Crown Court decisions would promote their wider availability.
Under present English law they do not have to find a home in an official series of published reports to
have binding effect.33 Any risk of the courts then being swamped by an avalanche of case law could be
mitigated through the issuance of procedural orders or practice directions,34 which currently state that an
unreported case is not usually to be cited in court unless it contains a relevant statement of legal principle
not found in reported authority.35 The eventual solution may be to tap on advanced technology to ensure
that counsel cite only the appropriate rulings in court.
The Place of Crown Court Decisions
If substantive Crown Court rulings are eventually to be recognised as having binding effect, what is their
status within the doctrine of precedent? The Magistrates’ Courts should presumably be bound by those
rulings.36 A concern in this regard is that lay justices in those courts may be less familiar than profes-
sional judges with the doctrine of precedent and related issues, such as whether a particular ruling is ratio
or obiter or made per incuriam.37 This is a legitimate concern but in my view it does not except those
sitting in the lower courts from administering justice consistently and in accordance with law, including
as pronounced by the higher courts. It would not seem helpful or appropriate for the Magistrates’ Courts
either to ignore relevant Crown Court decisions or to treat them as merely persuasive, given the risk of a
significantly uneven application of the criminal law.38 The better approach appears to be to accord such
30. Coral Reef (n 11) [66].
31. Lau (n 10) 418.
32. For instance, in addition to being located on paid subscription databases, a number of Crown Court rulings and decisions are
freely available on the Judiciary of England and Wales’ website at <https://www.judiciary.uk/court/crown-court> accessed 17
June 2020 and on BAILII at <http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/Misc> accessed 17 June 2020. The author is not presently aware
of any firm or official statement made as to the completeness of these archives or the system by which rulings and decisions are
selected to be uploaded.
33. Unlike, for instance, some jurisdictions in the United States that deny precedential status to judicial opinions not formally
published by a sanctioned reporter.
34. Something to which Lord Woolf CJ once resorted: Practice Direction (Citation of Authorities) [2001] 1 WLR 1001. See also
Noble v Southern Railway Co [1940] AC 583, 597; Roberts Petroleum Ltd v Bernard Kenny Ltd [1983] 2 AC 192, 200–202;
Hamblin v Field [2000] BPIR 621, 627–28; Michaels v Taylor Woodrow Developments Ltd [2001] Ch 493, [78]–[87]; A v B
plc [2002] EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195, [8]–[10]; Trembath v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2002] EWCA Civ
1445, [10]; R v Erskine [2009] EWCA Crim 1425; [2010] 1 WLR 183, [63]–[81]; G Lightman, ‘The Civil Justice System and
Legal Profession—The Challenges Ahead’ (2003) 22 CJQ 235, 239.
35. Practice Direction (Citation of Authorities) [2012] 1 WLR 780, [10]; Criminal Practice Directions 2015, Division XII
(General Application) paras D.3 and D.7.
36. See WHD Winder, ‘The Rule of Precedent in the Criminal Courts’ (1941) 5 JCL 242, 253 for a short discussion of the
relationship between the old courts of quarter sessions and assize courts; T Frost, R Huxley-Binns and J Martin, Unlocking the
English Legal System (6th edn Routledge, Abingdon 2020) para 3.3.6.
37. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for prompting reflection on this point.
38. Most obviously when different judges ascribe varying weight to the same precedent authority, such as when they take into
account intuitive and possibly subjective (but not always relevant) factors like how fully reasoned it might seem to be or the
distinction of the judge who issued it.
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decisions a strict binding effect, and to continue to provide lay justices with appropriate legal guidance
during their training phases and, while in court, through their clerks.
Whether substantive Crown Court decisions are of co-equal authority as decisions made in the High
Court is a more difficult question. Suggestions have previously been made, without definitive resolution,
that the Crown Court is bound by Divisional Court decisions.39 In this respect a brief examination of the
place of Upper Tribunal decisions may be helpful.
Relationship Between Upper Tribunal and High Court
Since the reorganisation of the tribunals system, the Upper Tribunal has liberated itself from having to
strictly follow decisions of the High Court. In 2010 it held that, where it was exercising a jurisdiction
formerly exercised by the High Court, it would not be bound by that court’s decisions but would, unless
convinced they were wrong, follow them out of comity.40 The position was thus the same as where the
High Court handled decisions of co-ordinate jurisdiction, with one qualification that the Upper Tribunal,
when dealing with highly specialised legislation, might in a proper case feel less inhibited in revisiting
issues decided at High Court level. These opinions were not commented upon when the case reached the
Court of Appeal.41
The Upper Tribunal has continued to press this freedom.42 Gilchrist v Revenue and Customs Com-
missioners43 contains an instructive discussion. There the tribunal reasoned that it was ultimately a
matter of parliamentary intention whether the Upper Tribunal was bound by High Court decisions. The
legislative establishment of the Upper Tribunal as a superior court of record, with power to set precedent,
together with the exclusion of the High Court from the appeal process or structure, strongly suggested
that the Upper Tribunal was not bound by decisions of the High Court.44 There were no indications to the
contrary. Advisers would not be placed in difficulty by having to face conflicting decisions of the High
Court on the one hand and those of the Upper Tribunal on the other, any more than if there were two
conflicting High Court decisions. The need for certainty was not offended by the Upper Tribunal
departing from High Court decisions.
The tribunal in Gilchrist considered all of this to be unaffected by R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal,45 in
which the Supreme Court had ruled that the High Court retained a supervisory jurisdiction in respect of
39. See Customs and Excise Commissioners v Newbury [2003] EWHC 702 (Admin); [2003] 1 WLR 2131, 2134; Revenue and
Customs Commissioners v Berriman [2007] EWHC 1183 (Admin); [2008] 1 WLR 2171, [28]; R v I-I [2009] EWCA Crim
1793; [2010] 1 WLR 1125, 1126; Channel 4 Television Corporation v The Commissioner for Police for the Metropolis [2019]
1 Costs LR 67, [89]. See also the assertion in Ingman (n 1) 211.
40. Secretary of State for Justice v RB [2010] UKUT 454 (AAC); [2011] MHLR 37, [40]–[47].
41. B v Secretary of State for Justice [2011] EWCA Civ 1608; [2012] 1 WLR 2043.
42. Kinsasi v Secretary of State for the Home Department (unreported, 4 June 2013, Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum
Chamber)), [81]; Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Noor [2013] UKUT 71 (TCC); [2013] STC 998, [49]; GR Solutions Ltd
v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2013] UKUT 278 (TCC); [2013] STC 2289, [16]; Gilchrist (n 25) [85]; ToTel Ltd v
Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2014] UKUT 485 (TCC); [2015] STC 610, [3]; Post Box Ground Rents Ltd v The Post
Box RTM Company Ltd [2015] UKUT 230 (LC), [35]; R (Hassan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKUT
452 (IAC), [88]; The Kingsbridge Pension Fund Trust v Downs [2017] UKUT 237 (LC); [2017] L & TR 467, [20]; West v
Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2018] UKUT 100 (TCC); [2018] STC 1004, [53]; Robertson v Gordon-Webb [2018]
UKUT 235 (LC); [2018] L & TR 31, [23]; Governing Body of Lark Hall Primary School v Secretary of State for Education
[2018] UKUT 294 (AAC), [22]; D v Information Commissioner [2018] UKUT 441 (AAC), [32]; R (MS) v Secretary of State for
the Home Department [2019] UKUT 9 (IAC), [107]; Hussain v Waltham Forest LBC [2019] UKUT 339 (LC); [2020] HLR 14,
[59]. For two discussions on tribunal precedents, see T Buck, ‘Precedent in Tribunals and the Development of Principles’ (2006)
25 CJQ 458; M Elliott and R Thomas, ‘Tribunal Justice and Proportionate Dispute Resolution’ [2012] CLJ 297, 319–20.
43. Gilchrist (n 25) [87]–[89].
44. There is in fact recent authority that the Upper Tribunal binds a Master sitting in the High Court; see Addlesee v Dentons
Europe LLP [2018] EWHC 3010 (Ch); [2019] 1 BCLC 570, [13], and on appeal [2019] EWCA Civ 1600; [2020] Ch 243, [2]
and [81].
45. [2011] UKSC 28; [2012] 1 AC 663.
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‘unappealable decisions’ of the Upper Tribunal. In the tribunal’s view, the issue of supervisory jurisdic-
tion was conceptually distinct from the question of precedent:
[T]he existence of a supervisory jurisdiction on the part of the High Court over the Upper Tribunal does not
imply that the Upper Tribunal is bound by the decisions of the High Court, as a matter of stare decisis. The
ratio of Cart’s case, concerning the grounds of judicial review of unappealable decisions of the Upper
Tribunal by the High Court, has no application to the question of whether the Upper Tribunal is bound by
decisions of the High Court in substantive matters.46
Gilchrist has been cited approvingly by the Court of Appeal without qualification.47
Relationship Between Crown Court and High Court
Viewed against what has been said of the Upper Tribunal, the important features of the Crown Court
appear to be the following. It is a superior court of record,48 from which appeals generally proceed to the
Court of Appeal.49 A limited subset of its decisions and exercise of jurisdiction is subject to the review
and supervision of the High Court.50 This fact does not of itself negate the possibility of substantive
Crown Court decisions being of co-ordinate status as High Court decisions, if the reasoning in Gilchrist
is found to be similarly applicable. Nor should it be relevant for the doctrine of precedent that the Crown
Court has no power to unilaterally make practice directions for criminal procedure in that court or the
Magistrates’ Courts51; if that were otherwise a similar disability would, for instance, improbably afflict
the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division.
Importantly, for the court or tribunal in question not to be bound by the High Court, the particular line
of reasoning in Gilchrist would require it to be exercising a jurisdiction formerly exercised by the High
Court.52 The question is whether this element must be present before the Crown Court may be freed from
46. Gilchrist (n 25) [98]. Notably, this was not a case where the High Court’s appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over a tribunal had
been excluded altogether. Without questioning the reasoning there, the exceptional scenario where the jurisdictional oversight is
totally excluded warrants a mention. In R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22; [2020] AC
491, the Supreme Court was divided (with Lord Lloyd-Jones not expressing any definite view) on whether, and if so to what
extent, Parliament could by statute oust the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction to review a decision of an inferior tribunal of
limited statutory jurisdiction: at [144], [168], [210] and [253]. What is relevant for present purposes is that Lord Carnwath and
Lord Sumption expressly considered in their judgments (at [112], [139] and [192]) the risk of an isolated tribunal system
developing ‘local laws’ that did not conform to the general law of the land. Each ultimately placed different weight on the value
of consistency, although one notes that the uninviting prospect of anomalous laws being created is much diminished if such a
tribunal is disabled from setting precedent. It is suggested that a hypothetical tribunal—care should be taken to set this apart from
the position of Judges sitting in the High Court, whose decisions have binding effect even though they are subject to neither
judicial review nor, if statute should so preclude, appeal (see Re Racal Communications Ltd [1981] AC 374, 384)—whose legal
rulings cannot be corrected in a judicial forum should not, as a matter of principle, be allowed to strictly bind itself or any tribunal
below it; any such ruling would be at best persuasive and avoidable by a later tribunal that was satisfied of its error (see also the
first instance judgment in R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2017] EWHC 114 (Admin); [2017] 3 All
ER 1127, [48]–[49]; BJ Ong, ‘The Ouster of Parliamentary Sovereignty?’ [2020] PL 41, 42–44).
47. Addlesee v Dentons Europe LLP [2019] EWCA Civ 1600; [2020] Ch 243, [87].
48. See n 24.
49. Criminal Appeal Act 1968 s 1.
50. Senior Courts Act 1981 ss 28 and 29(3). A relevant discussion of these provisions may be found at R v Crown Court at Ipswich,
ex parte Baldwin [1981] 1 All ER 596. It has been repeatedly said that, but for them, the Crown Court, a superior court of
record, would not be subject to any other court’s supervisory jurisdiction; see R v Manchester Crown Court, ex parte Director
of Public Prosecutions [1993] 1 WLR 1524, 1528; R v Chelmsford Crown Court, ex parte Chief Constable of Essex [1994] 1
WLR 359, 367–69; R (Shields) v Liverpool Crown Court [2001] EWHC 90 (Admin), [10]; R (Tapecrown Ltd) v Oxford Crown
Court [2018] EWHC 1450 (Admin); [2019] 1 WLR 3354, [31].
51. R (Sullivan) v Crown Court at Maidstone [2002] EWHC 967 (Admin); [2002] 1 WLR 2747. The empowering provisions are
currently contained in the Courts Act 2003 ss 68–74.
52. See text at n 34.
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having to follow an otherwise covering High Court decision. The answer, it is suggested, is no. The
Upper Tribunal was created in part to replace the High Court as the judicial forum for resolving certain
types of cases, and it is therefore understandable, from the perspective of ensuring future consistency of
decision-making in that forum, why it was seen to be a vital requirement for the Upper Tribunal to be
exercising jurisdiction formerly belonging to the High Court. In relation to the Crown Court, however,
what is relevant is not so much the historical fact that it is the successor to the courts of quarter sessions
and assize courts, but that among the matters it decides are trials of, and sentencing for, indictable
offences, over which the Crown Court has exclusive jurisdiction53; that most criminal appeals from the
Magistrates’ Courts will lie to the Crown Court, which, although not a decisive consideration, does mean
that that court is best placed to swiftly and consistently correct errors of law below; and that those cases
which exhibit signs of involving more intricate discussion of a point of law are generally heard or
reserved for hearing by more senior judges, such as High Court Judges or Circuit Judges.
Conclusion
In summary, if there should be established a reasonably satisfactory process to facilitate the systematic and
public dissemination (electronic or otherwise) of reasoned substantive decisions made in the exercise of the
Crown Court’s criminal jurisdiction, it is suggested that those decisions, whether made at first instance or
on appeal, should be recognised to have the following effect under the doctrine of stare decisis:
(i) Such a decision would bind judges and justices sitting in the Magistrates’ Courts. If a judge or
justice is faced with covering but conflicting decisions of the Crown Court and/or the High
Court, the decision generally to be followed is the one which has given full consideration to the
other decision(s) and which is not inconsistent with any higher authority of the Court of Appeal
(Criminal Division), the House of Lords or the Supreme Court.
(ii) Such a decision would not bind any judge or justice sitting in the Crown Court, but would
generally be followed out of comity unless he or she is convinced that it is wrong, in accordance
with the ordinary rule relating to judges sitting at co-ordinate jurisdiction54; the same treatment
should also apply with respect to High Court decisions when cited in Crown Court proceedings.
If a judge or justice is faced with two conflicting decisions, the second decision, if reached after
full consideration of the first decision, should be followed except where he or she is convinced
that that decision was wrong in not following the first.55 Judges and justices sitting in the Crown
Court, like their counterparts in the Divisional Court,56 would however be bound by decisions of
the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), the House of Lords and the Supreme Court.
(iii) Such a decision would not bind any judge sitting at High Court level or higher.57
53. Senior Courts Act 1981 s 46.
54. See, eg, Faulkner v Talbot (1981) 74 Cr App R 1, 4.
55. Pursuant to the practice described in Colchester Estates (Cardiff) v Carlton Industries plc [1986] Ch 80, 85; Bishopsgate
Investment Management Ltd v Maxwell [1993] Ch 1, 14; In re Lune Metal Products Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1720; [2007] Bus
LR 589, [9]–[10]; Howard de Walden (n 21) [90].
56. The Divisional Court when exercising criminal jurisdiction is generally thought to be bound by decisions of the Court of
Appeal (Criminal Division), even though it is to the Supreme Court that an appeal from the Divisional Court lies, with leave,
under the Administration of Justice Act 1960 s 1; see also C v Director of Public Prosecutions [1996] AC 1, 12–13; Morgans v
Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] 1 WLR 968, 979; WHD Winder, ‘Divisional Court Precedents’ (1946) 9 MLR 257,
260–62; Note, ‘Judicial Precedents in Criminal Law’ (1958) 22 JCL 155; Cross and Harris (n 1) 121; Ingman (n 1) 206;
Morgan (n 1) 427; Wilson and others (n 1) 195.
57. See Fitzgerald v Preston Crown Court [2018] EWHC 804 (Admin), [11]; Perrin v Northampton Borough Council [2006]
EWHC 2331 (TCC); [2007] 1 All ER 929, [41] and [44] (albeit with the caveat that it is not entirely clear from the written
judgment whether the Crown Court decision under discussion was made in the exercise of its civil or criminal jurisdiction).
Crown Court decisions made under its civil jurisdiction are not binding on the High Court; see R (Chief Constable of South
Yorkshire Police) v Crown Court at Sheffield [2020] EWHC 210 (Admin), [54].
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